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1 Introduction 
In April 2004, in Fallujah, the US Army started Operation Vigilant Resolve following the 
killing of four American private security specialists.1 Later that year, on 8th of November, 
US forces (together with the UK forces) launched Operation Phantom Fury, also known as 
Al Fajr.2 Fallujah was a city completely controlled by insurgents whose number the US 
forces estimated to be between 5000 and 6000.3 Fallujah was seen as the epicenter of the 
Iraqi insurgency and was US top priority in a broader campaign of their security strategy.4 
Between 50 000 and 60 000 civilians were believed to still remain in the city when the 
attack was launched.5 The city was said to be completely in ruins after the attacks.6 The last 
year’s reports about the negative health effects among the population7 and the symptoms 
that American soldiers who came home after serving in Iraq showed8, triggered the 
allegations suggesting that the US forces had used weapons that potentially could have 
contributed to the seriousness of the today’s situation. 
                                                
1 Garamone, Jim, ”Coallition working to Pacify Fallujah, Destroy Sadr Militia”, American Forces Press 
Service April 8 2004 : http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=26905 
See also ”The High-Contracting Business”, Private Warriors, Frontline, PBS: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/highrisk.html 
2 Garamone, Jim, ”Iraqi, U.S. Troops Begin 'Al Fajr' Operation in Fallujah”, American Forces Press Service 
November 8 2004: http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=24900 
3 Supra. 
4 Karon, Tony, ”The Grim Calculations of Retaking Fallujah”, Time Magazine, November 8 2004: 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,768590,00.html 
5 Supra. 
See also Monbiot, George, ”Behind the phosphorus clouds are war crimes within war crimes”, The Guardian, 
November 22 2005: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/nov/22/usa.iraq1 
6 Ali Fadhil, Guardian Films for Channel Four news, ”Fallujah-the real story”, 2005,  
See also ”City of Ghosts”, by Ali Fadhil, The Guardian, January 11 2005: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jan/11/iraq.features11 
7 Cockburn, Patric, ”Toxic Legacy of US assault on Fallujah worse then Hiroshima”, The Independent, July 
24 2010: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/toxic-legacy-of-us-assault-on-fallujah-worse-than-
hiroshima-2034065.html 
8 ”We track soldiers´sickness”, New York Daily News, September 29 2004: 
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/track-soldiers-sickness-article-1.568815 
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/small-victory-ailing-g-i-s-article-1.550397 
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1.1 Research questions and methodology 
 
On the basis of these attacks in Fallujah, conscious of the many uncertainties that still 
overshadow the factual background I nonetheless intend to explore whether the use of 
certain means and methods of warfare were in conformity with the principles of 
International Humanitarian Law, (IHL). If the attacks on Fallujah could presumably be 
linked to the effects on the environment and human health in that area over the last decade, 
would that comply with IHL? Are the means and methods chosen and the way they were 
used in Fallujah within the framework of IHL? If not, has their use provoked damage/injury 
that is disproportionate or/and militarily unnecessary for the military advantage 
anticipated?9 
First, it is important to identify the principles of IHL and in what international 
conventions they can be found. This part of the research, used throughout the thesis, is the 
traditional legal method, analyzing the existing and accepted sources of law in order to find 
out what the given rule is and how to fill out the interpretation of its text where necessary.10 
The traditional legal method also incorporates the examination of the different case 
law to analyze how the given rules, important for my case, were used and interpreted. The 
existing jurisprudence was then compared to the facts in my case for the sake of conceiving 
the possible outcome if the rules were to be interpreted in the same manner as given 
jurisprudence. 
 
1.2 The structure 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis, I have assessed how the notion of environment is 
understood in the legal discourse and what environmental damage might be perceived as. 
Despite the fact that some legal protection exist for the environment in the area of 
humanitarian law, armed conflicts of last decade show that this protection is not sufficient 
                                                
9 For the sake of this paper, damage and injury are used synonymously. 
10 Lomio, Spang-Hanssen and Wilson, ”Legal Research Methods in a Modern World: A Coursebook, Djof 
Publishing 2011, page 233 and 235. 
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enough to really make a difference.11 The provisions of Art 35(3) and Art 55 Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) set a very high threshold for environmental 
damage to be met. Given the likelihood that the effects on the environment from the attack 
in Fallujah would not reach that threshold of these two provisions for a number of reasons, 
this area of law might not help us in concluding the legality of the attack. In the third 
chapter I will assess why Art 35(3) and Art 55 AP I, directly protecting the environment, 
seem not able to assist us in analyzing environmental damages in Fallujah. 
There are also other rules that could be helpful for protection of the environment in 
law related to armed conflict. Although it has a different threshold test, the Convention on 
the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (ENMOD) deals with environmental modification techniques that might be 
beneficial where ENMOD can be applied. Unfortunately, the characteristics of the events 
in Fallujah is not likely to be something considered to fall within the definition of 
modification techniques where only conventional weapons have been used. 
Notwithstanding that there may well be harm that has been caused to the environment 
and environmental harm that indirectly affects the civilian population, there are other 
mechanisms within IHL that we may have to rely on in order to challenge the legality of 
the actions in Fallujah. These mechanisms would be the rules of military necessity, 
principle of distinction, proportionality principle and the meaning of military advantage. 
The interplay between these rules may help in properly addressing the consequences of 
both environmental damage and environmental damage that affects the civilian population 
that these events in Fallujah gave rise to. In order to answer the question whether the usage 
of chosen means and methods (such as the weapon MK 77 and other munitions containing 
white phosphorus) were excessive and/or unnecessary, we need to raise questions about the 
relationship between military advantage and military necessity. In chapter four, I will 
explain the meaning of the basic principles of IHL and in chapter five, I will analyze the 
relationship between the military advantage and military necessity in order to shed some 
light on whether what occurred in Fallujah and the damage that was created was excessive 
                                                
11 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) Publication, Protecting the Environment During Armed 
Conflict, An inventory and Analysis of International Law, 2009, page 4. 
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and/or unnecessary within the meaning of IHL. If this analysis would not be enough to 
answer my questions, the chapter six will deal with Martens Clause and the principle of 
humanity, if perhaps this principle might further help us in determining the legality of the 
damage caused to civilians and the environment. Following the principle of humanity, in 
chapter seven, I will try to problematize the issue of dealing with the balance between what 
is humanely acceptable and militarily necessary. Lastly, even the prohibition on 
indiscriminate attacks and precautionary principle are applicable when environment is 
being targeted, therefore, I will address these principles in chapter eight and nine. The 
thesis ends with some concluding comments. 
 
1.3 The alleged facts of the battle in Fallujah 
 
In November 2005 the Italian public television network Rai, broadcasted a controversial 
documentary called “The hidden massacre” by Sigfrido Ranucci and Mauricio Torrealta.12 
The documentary stated that the insurgence and civilians left in the city witnessed that the 
US forces had used chemicals and poisonous gas during the attacks. This conclusion was 
drawn due to the esthetics of the corpses they saw. Later on, this description is seemingly 
supported by individuals in the US military that explained what happens to the human flesh 
when it comes into contact with specific substances from the weapons that contain white 
phosphorus (WP).13 The US State Department denied that the white phosphorus was used 
for any other then illumination purposes.14 When the March-April issue of “Field Artillery” 
                                                
12 Fallujah Coverage, RaiNews24: 
http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/en/body.asp 
13 “A Debate: Did the US Military Attack Iraqi Civilians with white phosphorus bombs in violation of the 
Geneva Conventions?” Democracynow.org, November 8 2005: 
http://www.democracynow.org/2005/11/8/a_debate_did_the_u_s 
14 ”US used White Phosphorus in Iraq”, November 16 2005: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4440664.stm 
Popham, Peter, ”US forces used chemical weapons during assault on city of Fallujah”, November 8 2005: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/us-forces-used-chemical-weapons-during-assault-on-
city-of-fallujah-514433.html 
”Did the US Use ”Illegal” Weapons In Fallujah, Fallujah Coverage, RaiNews24: 
http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/en/illegal_weapons.asp 
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magazine suggested that it was used a bit more offensive, the US officials corrected the 
information admitting that they were used against enemy combatants.15 
As far as Mark-77 (MK 77) is concerned, it is a part of the incendiary bombs family, a 
direct evolution of M-47, the napalm bomb used in Vietnam.16 While the traditional napalm 
consists of a mixture of gasoline and benzene, the MK 77 contains kerosene-based jet fuel, 
a smaller concentration of benzene.17 Therefore, it is referred to as napalm-like incendiary 
weapon. The usage of this weapon in Iraq was first brought to the world’s attention when 
the Herald Correspondent Lindsay Murdoch reported from one of the first battles in Iraq 
suggesting that the napalm-like weapon had been used.18 Another article from San Diego 
Union Tribune alleged the same facts.19 These allegations turned into facts when Mr. Adam 
Ingram, UK defense minister of that time posted a letter where he confirmed that MK 77 
had in fact been used in Iraq.20 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
 
The thesis will focus on the legality of the damages presumably caused to the environment 
and that indirectly had an impact on the lives of civilians, due to the weapons that 
presumably have been used. 
The aim of the paper isn´t to speculate in the possibilities of individual criminal 
responsibility for those alleged facts. However, I will raise question about it in an 
explanatory manner where this might help us to understand the complex interaction 
                                                
15 Field Artillery, The Fight for Fallujah, March-April, 2005.  
16 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk77.htm 
17 Supra. 
18 Murdoch, Lindsay, ”Dead bodies everywhere”, Sydney Morning Herald, March 22 2003: 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/21/1047749944836.html 
19 Crawley, James W., ”Officials confirm dropping firebombs on Iraq”, San Diego Union-Tribute, August 5 
2003: http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030805-firebombs01.htm 
20 ”US lied to Britain over Use of Napalm in Iraq War”, by Colin Brown, The Independent, June 17 2005: 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0617-01.htm 
Monbiot, George, ”The US used chemical weapons in Iraq and then lied about it”, The Guardian November 
15 2005: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/nov/15/usa.iraq 
Read the letter here: http://www.rainews24.rai.it/ran24/inchiesta/foto/documento_ministero.jpg 
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between different principles of IHL. The aim is, nevertheless, to point towards legal 
questions that have arisen in the aftermaths of the battle in Fallujah. 
I will concentrate my research to two allegations made by various sources following 
the attacks in Fallujah and which continue to be made. These allegations claim that the US 
forces deployed a weapon known as Mark-77 (MK 77), the successor of napalm against 
combatants and civilians during the attacks in Fallujah. MK 77 contains white phosphorous 
(WP) that has certain effects on its own21. Other weapons containing WP have also 
allegedly been deployed against the city. 
I am aware that I am handling mostly allegations when it comes to the usage of MK 
77 in Fallujah, and that there is very little undisputed facts put to the test. We know that the 
attacks took place and we see that the situation has developed in a certain way. Whether 
this can be linked to that specific attack in Fallujah still remains very uncertain. However, I 
do see a possibility to present my point of view of the attacks and the possible results of 
these attacks in a broader perspective. If these allegations were true, given the 
consequences of the attack, in what way are they in compliance with the IHL? The way the 
newspaper sources are used is to help me in managing the jigsaw puzzle of the alleged 
scenario. I am not stating that the newspaper articles are accurate in their interpretation of 
the scenarios in the battle of Fallujah. They are, strictly speaking, guidelines to the better 
understanding of the possible legal outcome, if the allegations were to be accurate. 
There are also certain limitations in scientific uncertainties. The aim is not to 
establish scientific accuracy of the effects. I will concentrate on the legal outcome of the 
means and methods used in Fallujah if the linkage were to be established. Clearly there are 
also aspects of this issue that one would want to consider, not least whether these acts 
would also constitute a violation of the provisions of certain weapons conventions but due 
to the limitations of the thesis, such evaluation will not be possible here.  Lastly, for the 
same limiting reasons, I will not put any emphasis on explaining the international 
environmental law and the associated conventions for the protection of the environment in 
peacetime and their possible influence on international humanitarian law. 
                                                
21 International Peace Bureau, Disarmament for development program: http://ipb.org/i/disarmament-and-
development/III-E-01-DADP-ipb-appeal-us-white-phosphorus-use-iraq.html 
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2 The understanding of the concept of Environment and Environmental 
Damage 
2.1 What is environment? 
 
According to certain dictionary interpretations, environment incorporates both non-living 
and living environmental elements. Hulme states that there is no single accepted definition 
of the term “environment”, even within environmental law.22 The concept of environment, 
in the legal meaning of International Environmental Law, has been said to incorporate two 
distinct parts: the human environment and the natural environment.23  What has been 
recognized as “natural” environment in treaties protecting the environment, according to 
Hulme is “flora and fauna, air, soil, water, vegetation, habitat, forests, marine living 
resources, ecosystems, organisms, climate and agriculture”.24 The definition included in a 
specific treaty will be specifically adapted to the functions and objectives of that particular 
treaty. The generalization of each term is therefore not recommended as a definition. When 
it comes to interpretation of the environment within the meaning of armed conflicts, 
Security Council has created a definition in the SC Resolution 678 from 1991, for the 
specific purpose of interpreting the environmental damage caused by Iraq to Kuwaiti Oil 
Wells.25 The Resolution included air, soil, water, flora, fauna and the ecosystem formed by 
their interaction.26 Hulme is suggesting that “natural environment” acts upon an organism 
to the extent that it determines that organism´s fate. The biological interdependence, in 
other words, is of fundamental importance with regard to the severity of environmental 
                                                
22 Hulme, Karen, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2004, page 12. 
23 Supra. at p. 18. 
24 Supra. at p. 12. 
25 Hulme, supra n. 22, at p. 13. 
26 Supra.  
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damage.27 This is due to the creation of global mesh of climatic system where the 
ecosystem in one place can affect the ecosystem in another. 
People are also part of the environment and dependent on a healthy environment in 
which to live. The starting point of human environment is, not surprisingly, human beings. 
It is the environment that gives the human “his physical sustenance and affords him the 
opportunity for intellectual, spiritual, moral and social growth”.28 The concept is also based 
on inter-generational equity and the rights of future generations to a healthy environment. 
However, these two concepts are interconnected in the sense that when protecting natural 
environment, one is also protecting people. The two are indivisible.29 
 
2.2  What is environmental damage? 
 
The assessment of environmental damage is a complex question. There is no strict legal, 
nor strict scientific concept of what environmental damage is. When it comes to the 
definition of environmental damage, the word “damage” has a criterion of its own. As 
Hulme explains it, a damage, harm or injury requires the causation of some negative impact 
on the environment.30 The 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities defined damage to the Antarctic environment as “any impact on the 
living or non-living components of that environment or those ecosystems, including harm 
to atmospheric, marine or terrestrial life”.31 The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate 
Change has an even broader definition of what constitutes environmental damage that 
includes the effects on socio-economic systems and welfare.32 This implicates that different 
wordings are intended only as definitions for the different purpose of each treaty. This is 
                                                
27 Hulme, supra n. 22, at p. 13. 
28 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Preamble, para 1. 
29 Hulme, supra n. 22, at p. 16. 
30 Supra. at p. 23. 
She refers to Oxford English Dictionary when interpreting the word “damage” and the wordings “damage”, 
“harm” and “injury” she uses as synonymous. For the sake of simplifying the meaning of “Damage” in this 
paper, I will use the same wording as synonyms.  
31 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law & the Environment, third edition, Oxford University Press 
2009, page 7. 
32 Supra. at p. 6. 
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also the base for the meaning of environmental protection, making it predominantly 
anthropocentric. The Conventions regulating the laws of armed conflicts are no exceptions 
as they too provide for their own criteria when assessing environmental damage. 
What we know today is that damage can be caused by various different changes in 
ecosystems and can be strictly natural. But they are also caused by human activities, 
especially when it comes to the effects of waging war. The problem is determining what 
causation is responsible for which damage. Hulme suggests that first and foremost 
scientific determinations of damage are generally first made. When this is accomplished, 
the legal terminology is introduced within which the damage is either reduced or 
prohibited.33 Scientific testing can help in measuring the degree of the damage caused to a 
particular environment or ecosystem by the introduction of a specific substance. As the 
case is in Fallujah, when white phosphorus was introduced as a substance used in weapons 
that were deployed in Fallujah, the scientific measuring that would be needed is how much 
of that specific substance is present in the soil, water and air in Fallujah and what are or 
what would be the negative effects of such presence. What the outcome would be of such 
measurements might not be the subject to the same limitations as the legal regulations, on 
both national and international level. As Hulme points out, the definition of environmental 
damage found in treaty law and in domestic regulations will differ from a purely scientific 
assessment of damage in such way that the level of damage required before any legal 
regulation will be applicable will often be far higher that the actual term utilized by the 
particular treaty or domestic instrument.34 The various regulations on environmental 
protection use different kinds of alternative terms such as “effects”, “harm”, “damage”, 
“pollution, and “injury”. They all can be understood differently and have different legal 
outcomes, dependent on where and how they are used. This paper will only concern itself 
with the damage caused to the environment as human causation of harm due to the 
deployment of specific substances through certain means and methods of warfare. 
                                                
33 Hulme, supra n. 22, at p. 17. 
34 Supra. 
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3  Direct protection of the Environment applied to Fallujah case 
 
The provisions in AP I, Art 35(3) and Art 55(1), in my opinion, seem to have been an 
innovation for the IHL at the time of their adoption. This is of course due to the large-scale 
destruction that took place in the Vietnam Conflict. There was the recognition by state 
parties for the need to at least limit environmental damages during warfare.35 Art 35(3) and 
Art 55 of the AP I offer limitation to the damage done to the environment both when 
environment is a direct target in itself and as a part of collateral damage. 
The interpretation of the existing rules are said to take an anthropocentric point of view, 
which has been criticized.36 However, the Art 35(3) AP I suggests that environment in fact 
has some value per se. The article states: 
“It is prohibited to employ methods and means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment” 
This is one of the basic rules of AP I and does not directly refer to the survival of civilians.  
The prohibition is repeated in Art 55(1) AP I but has an additional reference to health and 
survival of the population. The article reads: 
“Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods 
                                                
35 Hulme, supra n. 22, at p.71. 
36 Dinstein, Yoram, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, second 
edition, Cambridge University Press 2010, page 204. 
For example, it has been stated that the treatment of the environment as a civilian object is too 
anthropocentric. Dinstein here considers that the criticism in fact misses the point. Dinstein explains; “as long 
as it is classified as a civilian object, the natural environment must not be the object of an intentional, direct, 
attack irrespective of the presence of civilians in or around it.” In my opinion, as a civilian object, 
environment seems to merit protection because it has an importance to civilians, not necessarily because it 
has a value per se. One can imagine that there are certain cases where the environment merits protection for 
its own sake. This is where I find that the criticism still makes sense. 
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or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the 
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population” 
The ICRC Commentary explain that the very essence of these two provisions is the concept 
of ecosystem (natural environment as opposed to human environment) merits protection 
from means and methods of waging war that upset the very balance of the natural living 
and environmental conditions.37 In Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, ICJ reaffirmed 
that Art 35(3) and Art 55 of AP I embody a general obligation to protect the natural 
environment against widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage. Such a 
protection could be achieved by prohibition of methods and means of warfare, which are 
intended, or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment.38 The 
wording of the provisions suggests that the damage is only prohibited above a specified 
threshold of harm. Indeed, to constitute a breach, damage has to be widespread, long-term 
and sever, which means that the damage done must have a cumulative effect (my 
emphasis). Although the terms are not specifically defined in the AP I, there is a general 
agreement that together, they establish a very high threshold because all three requirements 
need to be met. How long-term, widespread and severe the damage has to be in order to fit 
into the meaning of provisions is highly uncertain. There is even disagreement whether the 
oil spills and fires caused by Iraq to Kuwaiti oil wells during the 90/91 Gulf War crossed 
the triple standard requirements in the two provisions.39 Even though the outcome from 
those attacks resulted in emissions of several toxic particles that gave rise to acid rain and 
global warming and even though the smoke screen over Kuwait caused a ten degrees 
Celsius drop in temperature resulting in the coldest winter on record, there is an uncertainty 
whether those effects on the environment and harm related to them were “significant”.40 As 
                                                
37 ICRC Commentary to the AP I, page 409, para 1444. 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/b466ed681ddfcfd241256739003e6368/2f157a9c651f8b1dc12563cd0043256c!Op
enDocument 
38 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ 1996, page 242, para 31. 
39 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): ”Final report to the Prosecutor by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, page 7, para 15. 
http://www.icty.org/sid/10052 
40 Hulme, supra n. 22, at p. 165. 
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far as the wording of the provision is concerned, there is some indication that states 
considered the term “widespread” to refer to the area greater than several hundred square 
kilometers.41  Already on this point there is a high uncertainty that these provisions could 
be applied in our case. The city of Fallujah is said to measure 30 square kilometers, which 
does not fulfill what is required for widespread damage.42 
Besides being widespread and severe, the damage has to last for a period of decades, 
twenty or thirty years the minimum, for provision to be effective.43 In our case, it has been 
about eight years since the battle in Fallujah. Even though we can see certain evolvement 
of the effects on the civilian population, it is highly uncertain whether these effects can be 
expected to last two decades or more. It is also highly uncertain that these effects can be 
linked to the usage of conventional weapons in the first place without proper scientific 
evaluation. Even if the Art 35(3) can be found under the chapter on means and methods of 
warfare, it is very doubtful that such a high threshold can place any constrains on the use of 
conventional means and methods of warfare.44 Bothe explains that the major flaw of the 
two provisions, interpreting the qualifying wordings, is the fact that they are written in an 
era reflecting considerations for protecting the environment at that specific time in history. 
Today the needs look different and the wordings are being “more and more considered 
inappropriate”.45 
To this day, the environmental damage that fulfills all three requirements of these two 
provisions, hasn´t been acknowledged and we can conclude that it is highly doubtful that 
the case of Fallujah would be the first to meet the applicable standards for these two 
provisions. We can only turn towards the basic principles of international humanitarian law 
in order to find some guidance in qualifications of environmental damage caused in 
Fallujah and possible establishment of its excessiveness. 
                                                                                                                                               
It is worth mentioning that in the resolution 687 from 91, UN Security Coucil affirmed Iraq´s responsibility 
under international law for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources in Kuwait.	  
41 Supra. at p. 98. 
42 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/fallujah.htm 
43 Hulme, supra n. 22, at p. 94. 
44 Desgagné, Richard, The Prevention of Environmental Damage in Time of Armed Conflict: Proportionality 
and Precautionary Measures, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 3, 2000, page 113. 
45 Bothe, Michael, The Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, German Yearbook of 
International Law, Volume 34, 1991, page 57. 
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4  The principles of IHL and their applicability on the environment 
 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules that are designed to regulate the 
combat of war in international and non-international armed conflicts. In Public 
International Law, IHL is regarded as lex specialis as it is concerned with this specific 
situation of armed conflict. Sometimes, it is referred to as The Law of Armed Conflict. 
This body of law regulates the treatment of the individual, both civilians and military, in 
times of armed conflict. It regulates also the treatment of civilian objects and military 
objectives. It does so determining restrictions to the use of force against the enemy. These 
restrictions of Jus in Bello involve how the war is conducted, what means are chosen and 
what methods are best suited for the conduct of war to achieve the military purpose desired. 
 
4.1  The Doctrine of Military Necessity 
 
Military necessity can be explained as a necessity to achieve the very purpose of a specific 
attack, such as the submission of the enemy that will give the military forces definite 
military advantage. Military necessity means what needs to be done in order to achieve a 
specific military purpose. It implies identification of certain realistic measures in the course 
of action that will accomplish the desired military purpose in most efficient way.46  Military 
necessity is also interpreted strictly as an exception where “military necessity exempts a 
measure from certain specific rules of international humanitarian law prescribing contrary 
                                                
46 Hayashi, Nobuo, ”Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International 
Criminal Law”, Boston University International Law Journal, Vol. 28:39, 2010, page 44. 
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action to the extent that the measure is required for the attainment of a military purpose and 
otherwise in conformity with that law”.47 The rules that prohibit a certain action do so 
independent of military necessity if the rule does not explicitly state that exception due to 
military necessity is allowed. For instance, the IHL prohibits direct attacks against civilians 
and civilian objects. Such attacks are prohibited at all times and no military necessity can 
allow for any exception from that rule. On the other hand, when destruction of a civilian 
object is necessary to achieve a military purpose, the object could be considered to change 
into being military objective. In the Hostage Case, judge Carter remarked: 
“The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities 
of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law”48 
This can be another way of saying that military necessity needs to be established in order to 
make destruction of property lawful. Such necessity needs to be proven inevitable in order 
for its destruction to be justified. The word “imperatively” is taken from Hague Convention 
IV, Art 23(g).49 What it exactly implies is uncertain, especially when words such as 
“urgent”, “absolute” or  “unavoidable” have been used as synonyms.50 However, we can 
understand that it is some sort of justification for the damage done. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention expresses the same prohibition in Art 53 but here the destruction refers only to 
the Occupying power, other belligerents are not mentioned. The provision of Hague 
Convention still remains valid for the destruction not carried out by the Occupying power 
and can be used in a much more broader sense.51  
It is important to point out that Hague Convention codifies the laws and customs of war 
more as guidelines to the military. The Fourth Geneva Conventions’ primary aim is first 
and foremost the protection of civilians. Hague Convention is considered the written 
                                                
47 Hayashi, supra n. 46, at p. 59. 
48 Hostage case (USA v. List et al.) American Military Tribunal Nuremberg, 1948, passage 1253. 
http://werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/Hostage%20Case090901mit%20deckblatt.pdf 
49 It says; ”It is especially forbidden...to destroy or seize the enemy´s property, unless such a destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”.	  
50Dinstein, supra n. 36, at p. 7. 
51 ICRC, 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocols and their Commentaries; Convention IV Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Part IV: Execution of the 
Convention #Section II: Final Provisions, Article 154-relation with the Hague Convention. 
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embodiment of customary international law.52 Whatever the meaning of the word 
“imperatively”, it gives a clear understanding that destruction just for the sake of it, in 
certain cases, can hold the military party liable for the violation of IHL. It gives us an idea 
that there is a difference between civilized and uncivilized way to wage war and IHL points 
out the limits, which are not to be crossed. Criminal liability for the destruction of the 
enemy´s property is stated in Art 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the Rome Statute and has a reference to 
the word ”imperatively” in its travaux préparatoires but was then replaced by “military 
necessity”.53 As far as the Rome Statute is concerned, no other destruction of property but 
the “enemy´s property” includes the reference to the military necessity. 
When the military necessity is established, in order to proceed further in the planning 
of the military action, military forces need to know how to make a distinction between 
objects that are prohibited to target directly and objects that are considered to be military 
objectives. 
 
4.2  Principle of Distinction  
 
A rule of paramount importance in Jus in Bello is the principle of distinction between 
military objectives and civilian objects. Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva 
Convention Art 48 states; 
“In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between civilian population 
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives” 
                                                
52 ICRC, 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocols, supra n. 51. 
53 Dörmann Knut, ”Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Sources and Commentary”, Art 8(2)(b)(xiii), page 249. 
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The objects in wartime are either civilian objects or military objectives. In order to respect 
the provision of IHL that only military objectives can be attacked we need to know how to 
make such a distinction. Art 52(2) AP I sheds some light on the issue stating that military 
objectives are limited to those objectives, “which by their nature, purpose, location or use 
make an effective contribution to the military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization offer a definite military advantage” (my emphasis). Military 
objectives refer particularly to armed forces personnel of the adversary (apart from when 
they are being hors de combat),54 military transports, buildings used for military purposes 
but they can even be commercial objectives that contribute to military action, such as 
industrial plants.55 Apart from this, there is no specific list on what constitutes a military 
objective and it is mostly up to the commander’s discretion to interpret and decide. The 
clause, even though having tremendous importance is just formulated in general terms.56 
Even when assessing cases from latest decade, we can find the generalization of this 
norm.57 
The status of an object in wartime depends on the context in those particular 
circumstances and can change during the course of events. Even an object that is normally 
considered to be civilian object can become military objective if the object, by its use or 
purpose, would make an effective contribution to the definite military advantage. Professor 
Dinstein gave the example of a church that would normally be protected as it makes part of 
the civilian object but if the church, during the time of the attack, becomes a hiding place 
for the adversary party, than the church becomes a lawful military objective.58 For this 
reason, civilians that are present in buildings that constitute a lawful military objective may 
perhaps not be protected. If the object is not considered to be a military objective then the 
                                                
54 Referring to those ”out of combat”, i.e. wounded and sick or prisoners of war. 
See Kolb and Hyde, An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflict, Hart Publishing 2008, page 
15. 
55 Oeter, Stefan (in Fleck), The handbook of International Humanitarian Law, second edition, 2010, page 181. 
56 Bothe, Michael, Legal Restrains on Targeting: Protection of Civilian Population and the Changing Faces of 
Modern Conflicts, Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 2002, page 39. 
57 Prosecutor v. Blaskić, ICTY Trial Chamber, 2000, para 180. It is stated that ”Civilian property covers any 
property that could not be legitimately considered a military objective”. Unfortunately the Chamber did not 
elaborate further on what is legitimately considered to be a military objective.	  
58 Dinstein, supra n. 36, at p. 98. 
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object is considered civilian and protected under international humanitarian law. An attack 
that is directed at civilians or civilian objects constitutes an unlawful attack.59 
The principle of distinction is a norm of customary international law and it is 
applicable in both international and internal armed conflicts.60 This general principle of 
IHL is also applicable to the natural environment.61 Even in this aspect, it is seen as part of 
customary international law and supported by states´ military manuals.62 The natural 
environment may not be attacked unless it is a military objective and whose destruction is 
imperatively required by military necessity. 
It is possible to imagine that environment in itself could constitute a military 
objective if it by its use, purpose or location becomes the only way to gain definite military 
advantage.63 The certain military action might be necessary to achieve the military 
advantage desired. For instance, during Vietnam War the forest was targeted as a military 
objective and it was broken down so that the enemies would be more exposed in their 
hiding places. This required usage of herbicides that had disastrous consequences for the 
environment. 
Another provision in Art 54 AP I contains a prohibition on attacking, destroying or rending 
useless “objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” and there 
is a high risk to leave the civilian population without adequate food and water “as to cause 
its starvation or force movement”. This prohibition appears also as Rule 54 in ICRC 
Customary rules and is explained to be of a customary character.64 However, this 
prohibition is not absolute. As already mentioned, civilian object can in certain 
circumstances become military objectives and this is also applicable to objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, if and for such time the object 
offers direct support or sustains solely armed forces.65 But if destruction of such object 
                                                
59 Art 51(2) AP I states: ”The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
object of attack” see also Art 52(1). 
60 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, ICRC, 2005, 
Rule 7, page 25. 
61 Supra. at Rule 43, p. 144. 
62 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 60, at Rule 43, p. 144. 
63 Art 52(2) AP I. 
64 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 60, at Rule 54, p. 189. 
65 Art 54(3)(a) and (b) AP I. 
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would result in starvation of the population, the attack against such an object is prohibited 
regardless of the support to the enemy forces, given starvation as a method of warfare is 
prohibited.66 
Equally, natural resources, cattle, agricultural fields and drinking water dams could 
very much be referred to as objects of such a basic importance that they become 
indispensable to the human survival and fall under the meaning of Art 54 AP I.67 
Qualification of an object as military objective usually requires a link to the military action 
and to the circumstances ruling at the time. According to the provisions of IHL, a military 
objective needs to make effective contribution to military action. Further, the total or partial 
destruction of such an objective needs to offer a definite military advantage. In other 
words, one could argue that there is no point in destroying an object if it really does not 
fulfill a military purpose for the adversary. There simply could not be any advantage gained 
from the destruction. 
In our case, the city of Fallujah could contain several military targets whose partial or 
entire destruction would give the US forces desired military advantage, such as submission 
of the enemy. This would mean that the US forces need to evaluate which objects in the 
city would contribute to the overall purpose of the attack in order to make them lawful 
targets. It could also be argued that Fallujah as a city creates a military objective per se. If 
the insurgents are scattered over the entire city area and hide in various buildings and the 
circumstances at that time are such that its destruction is unavoidable to fulfill the military 
purpose, such as the neutralization of the enemy, according to the provision of IHL, 
Fallujah might be considered a lawful target. 
Nothing in the facts about this case suggests that environment was targeted directly as a 
military objective. What the facts suggest is that the US forces were interested in capturing 
and/or disabling the terrorist leader al-Zarqawi and about 6000 insurgents that were 
accompanying him. This could make for two individual military objectives, the capturing 
of a leader and disabling his troops. But it could also be treated as a single military 
objective as the leader and his insurgents usually operate side by side. When the insurgents 
                                                
66 Art 54(1) AP I. 
See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 60, at Rule 53. 
67 UNEP, 2009, supra n. 11, at p. 17. 
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establish hiding places in one or several buildings, the buildings are than targeted as 
military objectives. Nevertheless, such targeting would require that other equally important 
provisions of IHL protecting civilians and civilian objects have been assessed and are not 
breached. Under such circumstances where no other provisions of IHL have been breached, 
the civilian casualties and damage to the civilian objects, as well as environment, could 
constitute collateral damage. 
 
4.3  The understanding of Collateral damage 
 
Civilians and civilian objects are protected under the wordings of IHL from being directly 
attacked. However, the damage or injury to the civilians and civilian objects can very well 
be unavoidable and incidental casualties as a result of a lawful attack. The damage that is 
not purposely caused but occurs as a result of the attack is called collateral damage. It is 
incidental. And it is lawful if the overall military attack is lawful. 
Military necessity, proportionality assessment and military advantage go hand in 
hand. What military advantage is seeking to achieve is crucial in deciding upon what can 
constitute a military objective.68 The military advantage can be explained as being tied to 
the qualification of the military objective in those particular circumstances prevailing at the 
time. If there is no military advantage gained from destruction of a particular object then it 
cannot be considered as a military objective. Further on, what is necessary to do to fulfill a 
military purpose needs to be in proportion with the damage that the attack is expected to 
cause during the military operation. When it comes to environment and collateral damage, 
as it is with all other civilian objects, the harm caused to the environment must not be 
excessive in relation to the military purpose. Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons case, 
ICJ explains: 
“States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is 
necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objective. Respect for the 
                                                
68 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR), Commentary on Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Harvard University 2009, Section A: Military Advantage. 
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environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity 
with the principles of necessity and proportionality”69 
What ICJ is suggesting is that the environment needs to be taken into account when 
calculating collateral damage. When a military objective is under attack, the environment 
should already be included in the calculation of the excessive damage v. definite military 
advantage. In their review of the NATO bombing campaign, even the ICTY Committee 
stated that the “military objectives should not be targeted if the attack is likely to cause 
collateral environmental damage which would be excessive in relation to the direct military 
advantage which the attack is expected to produce”.70 How this could be achieved is up to 
every military force to decide respecting the given provisions on laws of war. 
The principle of proportionality is recognized as part of customary international law 
and equally applicable in relation to the environment.71 It is there to balance what is 
necessary damage in a military action and what is humanly acceptable.72 Here, the 
advantage anticipated is weight against the level of losses and damage done to the civilian 
objects. This status makes military advantage central to the proportionality assessment. 
Even though civilian lives will be lost during the military attack, it is legally acceptable if 
this loss is in proportion to the expected military advantage.73 The same can be applied to 
the environmental damage assessment. If the destruction of a cornfield (which by all means 
can be seen as indispensable to the human survival as it is expected to provide food for the 
inhabitants) is necessary for a military force to gain military advantage, the destruction can 
be justified on the basis of military necessity. However, if the destruction of a cornfield is 
necessary to gain just one battle (the rest of the events are, tentatively, very uncertain) and 
the destruction affects survival of 300 000 inhabitants then the military necessity 
assessment becomes more difficult. The advantage gained from the attack needs to be 
weight against the expected damage it may create. This is the basic concept of collateral 
                                                
69 Advisory Opinion, ICJ, supra n. 38, at p. 242, para 30. 
70 Final Report, ICTY, supra n. 39, at p. 8, para 18. 
71  Holland, Joseph ”Military objectives and collateral damage: Their relationship and dynamics, Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law, Volume 7 2004, page 51. 
See also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra nr. 60, at Rule 43, p. 146. 
72 Holland, supra n. 71, at p. 46. 
73 Advisory Opinion, ICJ, supra n. 38, Dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins, para 20.	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damage. According to the Art 54(2), objects that are indispensable to the human survival 
are not to be attacked unless they are directly supporting enemy operations and its 
destruction is a military necessity.74 However, if this destruction would result in possible 
starvation of the civilian population or force the civilian population to move, the 
destruction is prohibited.75 
In other words, if the environmental damage is a foreseeable result of a lawful attack, 
it is referred to as collateral damage. Environmental damage here encompasses both 
environment per se and environment as a part of a civilian object. Collateral damage has to 
be in proportion with the military advantage anticipated and needs not to be excessive. 
When the damage is excessive the attack becomes unlawful even if it is directed towards a 
military objective.  
                                                
74 Svensk manual i humanitär rätt m.m (Swedish Manual of Humanitarian Law) SOU 2010:72, Bilaga 7, 341, 
page 72. 
See also Joint Service Publication (JSP 383): THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, UK, 2004 Edition, 5.19, page 65. 
75 Art 54(3) and (4) AP I. 
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5  Military Advantage 
 
When military forces are about to launch an attack, the military objective chosen for that 
attack, with its total or partial destruction, needs to offer definite military advantage, with 
or without collateral damage. 
The definition of military advantage can be understood as an advantage from one 
specific attack, an advantage from one artillery round in one specific attack or advantage 
from the whole operation, the specific attack being just one part of the operation. The 
definition of an attack in Art 49(1) AP I seems to point to an isolated event as the notion is 
linked to the military objective.76 It could be understood as assessment of “one attack at the 
time” and each attack must fulfill the requirement for military advantage. The lawful 
military objective is chosen because it gives a desired military advantage at that specific 
point in time and therefore the needed advantage from that attack would constitute one 
specific event. But this interpretation is also understood as too narrow and several countries 
have expressed different opinion towards the meaning of military advantage and have made 
reservations to the AP I on this point.77 In accordance with the view of some states, Fleck 
also explains that military advantage is “advantage which can be expected from an attack 
as a whole and not only from isolated or specific parts of the attack”.78 In the UK Joint 
Service Publication of the Law of Armed Conflict (UK JSP), it has even been said that 
military advantage does not need to be immediate in order to count as military advantage.79 
Countries like Australia, New Zeeland and USA have also stated that according to their 
                                                
76 Oeter, (in Fleck), supra n. 55, at p. 185. 
The Art 49(1) defines “attacks” as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defense”. 
77 Joint Service Publication (UK JSP 383): THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, UK, 2004 Edition, page 56. 
78 Oeter, (in Fleck), supra n. 55, at p. 185. 
79 UK JSP 383, supra n. 77, at p. 56.	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view, military advantage also “includes the security of attacking forces.80 Further on, when 
several states are combining a military operation, such as NATO strikes, the military 
advantage “may accrue to the benefit of an allied country or the coalition in general”.81 It 
could be argued that this perhaps is to go to far in the interpretation of the military 
advantage but, nevertheless, such point of view seems to exist among the states. 
My understanding of what allegedly happened in Fallujah derives from material that 
not necessarily provides the most certain factual analysis. In the light of this material I need 
to make a number of presumptions for the purpose of identifying what constitutes military 
advantage in this particular case that I am concerned with. 
For the purpose of this paper and because the factual evidence to rely upon is insufficient, I 
will not concern myself with military advantage as per each individual attack. Instead, I 
will approach a matter as a battle in Fallujah, an entire operation whose surrender could 
have an effect on the continuation of the further operation in Iraq. If we were to apply this 
notion to Fallujah, than the attack on Fallujah could be seen as an attack whose military 
advantage may be linked to the Iraqi war as a whole. It would be a separate action within 
the ultimate operation and the definite military advantage of that attack would mirror the 
definite military advantage, strategically important in further evolution of military 
operations. In my opinion, definite military advantage is perhaps the advantage that takes 
the military forces at least one step closer to the fulfillment of the very purpose of waging 
war and therefore it has to be seen in the light of this purpose and not just as an 
independent and isolated event. According to some alleged facts presented in the 
introduction, Fallujah was seen as the epicenter of the Iraqi insurgency and such a case 
would create an idea that the attack to neutralize the enemy may be considered to give the 
desired military advantage to the US forces, not only in Fallujah but perhaps to the Iraqi 
operation as a whole. Would this mean that the military advantage in such a case would not 
be restricted only to the attack on Fallujah but would apply to the overall contribution to 
the entire Iraqi operation? 
                                                
80 Dinstein, supra n. 36, at p. 93. 
Meaning that military objectives may constitute objects not traditionally seen as military objectives if they are 
important for the security of the enemy. 
81 Supra. 
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Perhaps a better understanding of the relationship between military advantage and 
proportionality principle offer a further insight. 
 
5.1  Military advantage in relation to proportionality 
 
Finding the balance between military considerations and the principle of humanity is 
probably one of the hardest tasks when planning a battle and when decisions are taken 
during a battle.82 The question of what constitutes military advantage at that particular 
assessment of the situation is perhaps equally important as what constitutes excessive loss 
of lives and damage to the civilian objects. This requires that those who are in charge of 
planning a battle inform themselves as much as possible, or at least as much as it is feasible 
to expect from them to obtain information necessary in order to make the right decision.83 
The embodiment of the proportionality principle is found in Art 51(5)(b) AP I: 
“An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”84 
 
The word “definite” (that is found in Art 52(2) AP I) has been explained in the UK JSP as 
“concrete and perceptible military advantage rather then a hypothetical and speculative 
one”.85 However, if there is collateral damage involved, or at least if it is obvious that 
civilians or civilian objects (or a combination thereof) will be in danger of being harmed, 
the military advantage needs to be “concrete” and “direct” in order to justify such harm. In 
other words, the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated needs to be in 
proportion to the collateral damage it is expected to cause.  
                                                
82 Gasser, (in Fleck), supra n. 55, at p. 249. 
83 Art 57 2(a)(i) AP I. 
84 See also the same wording in precautionary rules in Art 57(2)(a)(iii) and Art 57(2)(b) AP I. 
85 UK JSP 383, supra n. 77, at p. 56. 
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Relying on proportionality on the basis of these two adjectives describing military 
advantage is not to be seen as an easy task. What is “concrete” and “direct” in an objective 
assessment of military advantage of a commander in charge? The adjectives “concrete” and 
“direct” in Art 51(5)(b) AP I might be a higher requirement to fulfill then the adjective 
“definite” as in definite military advantage as Holland finds in his argumentation.86 But, as 
pointed by UK JSP, there is a tendency to use the word “concrete” when analyzing military 
objectives for the “definite” military advantage and when comparing the amount of 
collateral damage to the “concrete” military advantage. This of course might be one way of 
simplifying the task of assessment for those planning the attack, using the same criteria for 
assessment of military advantage for both military objectives and collateral damage. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Holland points out the relationship between military objectives 
and proportionality and their common term “military advantage”.87 He finds; “the more 
military advantage associated with an object the more collateral damage is legally 
permissible in an attack”.88 From this the logical conclusion is that the higher the collateral 
damage, the higher the demand of military advantage from the attack. This is also the 
opinion of ICTY Committee that recognized the importance of the target in relation to the 
incidental damage expected: “if the target is sufficiently important, a greater degree of risk 
to the environment may be justified”.89 How big or important military advantage is, in 
those particular circumstances, will effect the amount of damage accepted for that specific 
advantage. Anticipation of such importance is what makes the damage accepted. As stated 
in HPCR Commentary: “the actual results of an attack are irrelevant to the reasonableness 
of the assessment of the military advantage at the time when the attack was planned or 
executed”.90 Accordingly, if there is no military advantage to be gained from the attack 
there could be no civilian losses because any civilian loss equated to no military advantage 
would, in the light of IHL principles, constitute a disproportionate damage. 
 
                                                
86 Holland, supra n. 71, at p. 52 and p. 53. 
87 Supra. at p. 52. 
88 Supra. at p. 53. 
89 Final Report, ICTY, supra n. 39, at p. 8, para 19. 
90 HPCR, supra n. 68, at Section A: Military Advantage, para 2. 
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5.2  Military advantage in relation to military necessity 
 
Considering the possible factual scenarios from the battle in Fallujah, one could ask what 
kind of military advantage could be gained from the partial or complete destruction of that 
city? Or in other words, what kind of military advantage is necessary for the overall 
purpose of the military attack? In the Hostage Case, judge Carter stated: 
“Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount 
and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible 
expenditure of time, life, and money. In general, it sanctions measures by an occupant 
necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operations. It 
permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose destruction is 
incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; it allows the capturing of 
armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent 
inhabitants of purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill.”91 
This might suggest that a military force may use all means necessary (and for that time 
being available) to bring the enemy to surrender as long as the action really is necessary to 
fulfill the mission. In my opinion, this incorporates the term “military advantage”.  The 
advantage sought is necessary because it will help a commander reach the goal of 
submission of the enemy “at the earliest possible moment with the least possible 
expenditure of men and resources”.92 For such reason, the advantage is a necessity for 
reaching that ultimate goal. Ensuring submission of the enemy means, not only the usage of 
cheapest means possible, but also assessing the possible exposure to the risks to 
commanders own soldiers. Naturally, fewer soldiers to fight can mean risk of not gaining 
military advantage in future battles.93 
                                                
91 USA v. List et al. supra n. 48, at passage 1253. 
92 Neuman, Noam, Applying the rule of Proportionality: Forge protection and cumulative assessment in 
International Law and Morality, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 7, 2004, page 91. 
93 Supra. at p. 91.	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The statement of judge Carter can been criticized of being to permissive and implying that 
any necessity is permissible if it will result in a military advantage.94 Of course, this would 
be to imply that even the prohibited actions in a war are to be considered permissible if 
they result in a military advantage. This is, however, not the case. The actions that are 
absolutely prohibited under IHL, such as direct attacks on civilian objects, etc., will never 
be justified under the doctrine of military necessity. Military necessity and military 
advantage need to be in compliance with the rules of engagement at all times. 
Military advantage may be seen as a necessity to win the battle in the short run and to 
win the war in the long run. In other words, the advantage that a belligerent seeks must be 
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the belligerents´ actions, whichever of the two 
possibilities it might be. The purpose here can be either a purpose for which the military 
advantage is sought or the purpose can be military advantage in itself. If the damage is 
unavoidable because the purpose of destruction is a military necessity, then the damage can 
also be seen in proportion to that necessity.  
Perhaps it would be illogical to consider an attack that has no military necessity 
provides a military advantage in the light of IHL provisions.  It is perhaps a question for 
discussion whether an unnecessary attack could result in a military advantage. Indeed, it 
could be military advantageous to kill the adversary for preventive reasons even if 
necessity wasn´t the case at that time. However, the legality of that action would perhaps be 
questioned on the bases of necessity and not on the basis of advantage as the discussion 
was in Hostage case. 
In the Fallujah case, if the purpose of this attack was in fact to win the war in Iraq, then 
military advantage anticipated must include the calculation of the “concrete and direct” 
possibility to win Iraqi war. It needs to be a tangible possibility or even probability that 
such an attack on Fallujah could result in winning the Iraqi war. However, nothing in the 
circumstances ruling at that time suggested that with the neutralization of the enemy in 
Fallujah, the US forces could celebrate their victory and return home. On the contrary, 
according to the circumstances ruling at the time, along with other uncertainties circulating 
around the given reasons for this attack to happen in the first place, it was not even certain 
                                                
94 Dinstein, supra n. 36, at p. 4. 
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whether the terrorist leader, whose capture was of paramount importance according to the 
US forces, was residing in Fallujah at the time of the attack.95 An attack on Fallujah would 
be military advantageous when enemy has been neutralized because such a neutralization 
of the enemy may have a desired effect at that specific time and place under the ruling 
circumstances. Whether that effect would echo positively on the further development of 
Iraqi war would be highly speculative. In my opinion, the possible concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated following the attack on Fallujah is the neutralization of the 
enemy in Fallujah at the circumstances ruling at the time. For such reason, an attack on 
Fallujah is a military necessity to achieve that specific military advantage anticipated. 
The way I understand the relationship between military necessity and military 
advantage is that the military advantage is an inherent part of military necessity in the way 
that any necessary attack is also military advantageous otherwise there would not be a need 
to undertake that act unless there were any advantage resulting from it. Indeed, disabling 
the enemy is axiomatically advantageous. In such case, military advantage has already been 
included in the considerations of military necessity. What creates military necessity is 
usually the very purpose of the military action. This does not mean that all means and 
methods are allowed in order to achieve that purpose. As stated earlier, international 
humanitarian law defines the limitations on the use of violence in armed conflicts in certain 
situations and prohibits them in others. Whether the unavoidable destruction of the entire 
city to neutralize the enemy is in proportion to that advantage is perhaps the next question 
to be answered. For that reason, it seems reasonable to explain further the meaning of 
military necessity in order to understand better the advantage sought and the damage it may 
create. 
 
5.3  Military necessity in relation to Proportionality 
 
An attack that creates incidental damage to its surroundings, may it be civilians or civilian 
objects, that is in proportion to the military advantage anticipated can be a lawful attack in 
                                                
95 http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/conflictiniraq/p/fallujah.htm 
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the light of IHL provisions. Excessive collateral damage is one of those important limits 
where the damage needs to be in proportion to the purpose of launching the attack. In cases 
where the incidental damage created by an attack is not in proportion with the military 
advantage sought, the damage is said to be excessive which makes the attack unnecessary 
and unlawful. Hayashi treats military necessity by breaking it down into four requirements 
where all four requirements need to be fulfilled for the necessity to really state a military 
necessity. Provided that the purpose sought to be achieved (like military advantage) and the 
measure chosen for achieving that purpose (an attack) is in conformity with international 
humanitarian law, the measure needs to be taken for some specific military purpose and the 
attack needs to be required for the attainment of the military purpose. If this is not the case, 
then the measure taken is “militarily unnecessary”.96 This would suggest that if the measure 
chosen creates a damage that is considered disproportionate to the purpose, it would mean 
that the damage is not in accordance with IHL. In that case and according to Hayashi´s 
findings, such disproportionate damage would make the claiming of military necessity 
void. 
When it comes to collateral damage, Hayashi explains that “proportionality weights 
the injury that the measure would cause to protected persons, objects and interests vis-à-vis 
the value of the military purpose that the measure would achieve”.97 Supposing that a 
lawful military objective is under attack, the proportionality principle offers evaluation of 
collateral damage v. military purpose of that attack. If the damage is proportionate for the 
military purpose sought, the attack constitutes a lawful attack. If the damage is 
disproportionate to the military purpose sought then the attack is unlawful even if military 
necessity could be claimed to exist. On the other hand, unnecessary attacks are unlawful, 
no matter what the proportionality assessment might conclude. In the end, all four subjects 
must be in accordance with the provisions of IHL, otherwise the military necessity cannot 
be established and rendered void. In the same sense, if an attack is found to be militarily 
unnecessary than there are good reasons to claim that it also becomes unlawful. Perhaps my 
point of view on what military necessity ought to be is too idealistic compared to the 
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realities of war. But I would like to believe that just because it is hard to obtain a situation 
where all parts of the attack are militarily necessary (as it is a question of proof and what 
information was available at the time) doesn´t mean that it should not be strived for. In the 
same sense, just because it is highly doubtful that any assessment of the military operation 
planning done by a commander would be a completely objective assessment, it does not 
mean that objectivity is not worth to be included in the provisions of IHL. 
In my point of view, military necessity and proportionality are interconnected in such a 
manner that military necessity dictates the amount of proportion of the injury accepted for 
the purpose to the extent that the higher the importance of purpose sought, the higher is the 
acceptance of the amount of collateral damage. It is so until the injury falls over the line, 
becomes excessive and dismisses the claim of military necessity. One can be of the view 
that necessity has nothing to do with the proportionality as far as it concerns the amount of 
injury expected. It has to do with the principle of humanity. What is humanly acceptable in 
a situation that claims collateral damage is what creates proportion. I do agree with the part 
where humanity appeals to us as humans not to commit acts that can be avoided. The way I 
see it, what is humanly acceptable is also what is militarily necessary otherwise we would 
not be in the situation where we need to assess proportionality. Because, in my view, when 
the attack is launched, the proportion of injury the attack creates also becomes necessary 
for the purpose to be achieved. 
However, the establishment that an attack constitutes an unlawful attack does not 
automatically mean criminal liability for that attack. Art 85(3) points that a grave breach of 
the Protocol is at hand when the act is committed willfully, in violation of the relevant 
provisions and in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects (my emphasis). In Blaskić Judgment, ICTY Trial 
Chamber commentary explanation is that the destruction unjustified by military necessity, 
to constitute a grave breach, it must be “extensive”, “unlawful” and “wanton”.98 As pointed 
out by Trial Chamber, each situation merits its own evaluation when it comes to evaluating 
extensiveness. Even a single act can be enough to constitute a grave breach of Geneva 
Conventions if the expected loss of lives and expected damages to civilian objects is 
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excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated. Professor Dinstein is arguing 
that this confusion between “extensive” and “excessive”, also committed by ICRC 
Commentary, needs to be clarified on the basis that even the extensive collateral damage 
need not to be excessive in light of the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.99 
In my view, there are four subjects that can be assessed to identify the meaning of 
military necessity when planning a military operation: 
- Military advantage (purpose of that operation) – a necessity in accordance with IHL 
- Military objective (target of that operation) – a necessity in accordance with IHL 
- Means (measure of that operation) – a necessity in accordance with IHL 
- Collateral damage (injury resulting from that operation) – in proportion to a 
necessity in accordance with IHL 
If the purpose is to disable the enemy from future battles and the enemy is hiding in various 
building in the city, as the case is with Fallujah, then the US army chooses the city as a 
military objective. Suppose that this is a lawful decision, that such an objective renders the 
attack lawful, we can say that attacking Fallujah is a military necessity because disabling 
enemy from future battles is a military necessity. If such an advantage cannot be achieved 
by targeting the entire city then there is no military necessity emerging from that attack. 
Further, it would not be enough to make just these two assessments to make the attack 
lawful. What measures the US army chooses for obtaining the advantage sought must also 
be a military necessity. Here, it can be said that the choice of weapons has to be in 
accordance with the achievement of that purpose, nothing more nothing less. If it is less 
than required for the achievement of the purpose, the purpose would not be achieved and 
no military advantage can be obtained. Such an attack would be unnecessary because the 
injury created by that attack would not be in proportion to the advantage anticipated.100 On 
the other hand, if the weapon chosen is more than required for the destruction then the 
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attack may create injury that is not in proportion to the purpose sought and will be 
unnecessary for that reason. If the army chooses a weapon that will achieve the purpose of 
the attack but that creates injury that is disproportionate to the attack than such an attack 
would be military unnecessary. 
Even if it is hard to reflect over the need to consider between the collateral damage 
and the military advantage, there is indeed some element of equation in the assessment of 
disproportionality. The case of Fallujah is no exception. What we have at hand is the fact 
that about 60 000 civilians were left in the city and the US forces had allegedly targeted 
two military objectives (or just considered them as one) that would give them military 
advantage anticipated. The first assessment is that between the first military objective, the 
terrorist leader weight against 60 000 civilians. The second assessment is between the 6000 
insurgents weight against 60 000 civilians. 
Based on previous suggestions, when it comes to means and methods chosen for the 
attack, the principle of necessity offers evaluation if those in charge of planning and 
executing attack have done everything in their power to verify that the attack being 
launched really is necessary. One question could be; is there any other way to gain same 
military advantage with less collateral damage?  If there is, does the law require that such 
measure be chosen? 
 
5.4  Precautionary measures as a part of military necessity assessment 
 
The precautionary measures can be found in two provisions of AP I. Art 57 states 
precautions in attacks, and Art 58 is stating precautions against the effects of attacks. It has 
been said that its purpose is twofold.101 It ensures the respect for the identification of the 
already mentioned principles of distinction and proportionality but also contains 
autonomous obligation to minimize adverse effects on civilians. For instance, those who 
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plan the attack must pay attention to Art 57(2)(a)(i) of AP I and do everything feasible to 
make sure that objectives chosen for the attack really are military objectives within the 
meaning provided in Art 52 AP I. They must also be certain that the military advantage 
anticipated really is definite. Art 57(2)(ii) AP I is concerned with evaluation of different 
choices of means and methods that are offered to those who plan a military operation. It 
states: 
“Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall…take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of attack with the view to avoiding, and in any event 
minimizing, incidental loss of life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects” 
The provision includes the evaluation of which weapons are being used, their range and 
overall effect as well as the time and place chosen for that specific attack.102 To be legally 
bound by precautionary measures means to ensure that the choice of weapons and 
ammunition used in an attack do not cause unnecessary suffering and superfluous injuries 
to both civilians and military staff. It means that all other effects not intended but can be 
avoided, should be avoided. In that case, it can be said that precautionary principle also 
creates an obligation to minimize collateral damage.103 What the word “feasible” implies is 
that all circumstances, practically possible at the actual time, need to be taken into 
consideration, including humanitarian as well as military considerations.104 The feasible 
precautions to avoid, or at least minimize incidental damage to the environment is included 
in this principle.105 Military commanders can thus be said to have an obligation to select 
type of weapons and method of deploying those weapons that are best suited for the attack, 
of course, together with assessing expected effects on civilian lives and objects. As ICRC 
Commentary remarks “when a well-placed 500 kg projectile is sufficient to render a 
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military objective useless, there is no reason to use a 10 ton bomb or a series of projectiles 
aimed without sufficient precision”.106 Such a case would be militarily unnecessary and the 
damage would be disproportionate to the overall goal. But we can also imagine situations 
where even a 500 kg projectile deployed in an urban area creates damage that could be seen 
as excessive in comparison with the purpose to be achieved. In such a case, would the 
choice of a 500 kg bomb, being the lesser of two evils, mean that it is a lawful choice 
because there still exists a military necessity for the purpose to be achieved? According to 
Hayashi, even if the measure chosen is the least injurious of all alternatives that are 
reasonably available and materially relevant to the purpose, the military necessity is still 
inadmissible if the result is disproportionate for the purpose sought.107 Such a case would 
require the commander to abort military operation. 
There is also another provision in Art 57(3) AP I that illustrates the question of 
choice: 
“When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar 
military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be 
expected to cause least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects” 
An attack can have concrete and direct military advantage and create collateral damage that 
is in proportion to that advantage at the same time where another solution was available 
offering the same military advantage but with less collateral damage. If there is another 
choice with less collateral damage, then the attack that creates more collateral damage can 
be assumed to be unnecessary. To choose such an attack may perhaps constitute a breach of 
IHL because precautionary measures clearly state, that the attack with less collateral 
damage, in such case, needs to be chosen. If one comes to a conclusion that there was no 
military necessity because another less severe solution was possible then there is no need to 
discuss proportionality because the attack is proclaimed unlawful already on the basis of no 
military necessity. This still requires that the means and methods chosen do not breach 
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other principles of IHL. The evaluation of what kind of choices were at hand in that 
particular situation can be easier to objectively evaluate than to objectively evaluate if 
civilian casualties from the chosen attack really were excessive. It can be more obvious if it 
can be established that there were other means and methods at commander’s disposal to 
choose from to accomplish same definite military advantage. 
The task of a military commander includes the successful execution of a military 
mission as well as compliance with the laws of armed conflict. Commanders are very 
seldom also humanitarian lawyers, nor should that be expected of them. The way they 
assess what is necessary to target to achieve military advantage perhaps differs from what a 
humanitarian lawyer would find, assessing the same situation. Especially when the 
commander includes the risk to his own soldiers in the assessment of military necessity and 
advantage and IHL does not offer any provisions dealing with this specific issue.108 There 
is no obligation for commanders to expose their forces to greater danger in order to limit 
civilian casualties.109 In fact, in NATO bombing case, ICTY made a statement where it was 
concluded that there was “nothing inherently unlawful about flying at such heights in order 
to avoid attack by enemy air defenses“ even though it made it much more difficult to 
distinguish between military and civilians on the ground and there was only one person 
making up the military crew in a F16110. Indeed, military necessity would suggest that it is 
in order to fly at such a high altitude in order to avoid being targeted by adversary. If such a 
choice is justified by military necessity and collateral damage created was in proportion 
with the advantage anticipated then I might also agree with the conclusion of ICTY. But in 
this case before ICTY, the refugee convoy of over thousand civilians (majority of women, 
children and elderly) on Djakovica road, was targeted resulting in around 70-75 killed and 
around 100 wounded.111 There are clear indications that point to the insufficient 
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precautions taken in this attack, including the fact that NATO did not have sufficient 
information in order to make the correct decision that resulted in civilian losses. Even if 
there were reports that Serb military did use civilian vehicles, the difference between 
civilians and military personnel could not have been spotted from the height NATO chose 
to maintain. 
The purpose of IHL is to protect the civilians and in case of a doubt whether an 
object is civilian or military, the object shall be considered civilian.112 In case such a 
difference cannot be spotted then the attack stands no chance in being launched against a 
specific military objective. If the military forces were intermixed with civilians, as the case 
was on Djakovica road, and the civilians outnumbered the military than the assessment of 
precautionary measures would show that launching an attack under those circumstances 
might be excessive to the military advantage anticipated (the destruction of Serb military). 
Later in Galić case, ICTY Trial chamber explained that determination of proportionality 
depends on “whether a reasonably well-informed person…making reasonable use of the 
information available to him/her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result 
from the attack”.113 The civilian casualties might have been avoided or at least minimized if 
NATO selected a lower altitude for the operation. Precautionary principle clearly states that 
if another choice was available then the lesser of two evils should have be chosen, provided 
that it does not create disproportionate results. After all, isn´t the risk of being killed in a 
combat an inherent part of what it means to be a soldier? Or is this risk presented to the 
soldiers suddenly above and beyond the risk assessment of civilian casualties?114 Even 
though in different context, the Galić case can serve as an example where it was concluded 
that it is not the real number of casualties in comparison to the military casualties that make 
an attack disproportionate. It is on the basis of the fact that under certain circumstances, an 
attack on a crowd of around thousand people can be expected to cause injuries to civilians 
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that clearly outweighs the military advantage anticipated.115 It is this expectation of the 
result, not the result per se that makes attack disproportionate. It is in my opinion pure luck 
that NATO operation didn´t result in more civilian casualties. The fact that it didn´t does 
not make the attack less unlawful. The NATO attack on Djakovica road was found not to 
“display the degree of recklessness in failing to take precautionary measures which would 
sustain criminal charges” while the attack in Galić case was declared unlawful by majority 
of the trial chamber.116 Even if the civilians weren’t intentionally attacked in NATO case, 
in my opinion, what ICTY failed to assess in NATO case, it did assess in Galić case 
presenting inconsistences in their legal approach of the two similar situations. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict the exact impact of an attack. We can just 
assume that those in charge possess that kind of expertise to spot a situation where civilian 
casualties clearly outweigh military gains. Even though commanders have great margin of 
discretion assessing that risks, they do have the obligation to ensure that the military 
operation complies with the duty to take precautionary approach as stated in Art 57 of AP 
I.117 Because of their duty as commanders, the presumption can be made that those who are 
in charge of planning and making decisions in a battle have taken military necessity into 
consideration before going further with engaging into military action. It is easier to spot a 
difference between the meaning of bombardment of a military building stating military 
necessity and the bombardment of a Red Cross medical unit stating military necessity.118 
The middle road is something of a grey area. Especially when it is overshadowed by the 
difficulties presented in the assessment of what constitutes a military objective, all the way 
to the assessment of necessity and proportionality. 
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6  Martens Clause – the principle of Humanity and the Environment 
 
Another underlying ground to the principle of precaution of paramount importance is to 
spare humans from unnecessary suffering.119 This is also another reason why there are 
limitations to means and methods to wage war. Because this notion in the law is generic it 
can be referred to both civilians as well as combatants. Perhaps, it would not make sense to 
state that the damage that is prohibited to cause against combatants would be seen as 
perfectly legal to be caused to civilians. What is considered to be inhuman treatment of 
combatants cannot be anything but inhumane treatment of civilians. 
The law cannot regulate every detail in a war or a combat. Where there is no specific 
prohibition in written law or where the laws´ customary qualification is uncertain, Martens 
Clause can be invoked. Martens Clause refers to “the principles of humanity” and “the 
dictates of public conscience”.120 It is a moral principle of conduct of war. It can be found 
in the preamble of Hague Convention IV and reads: 
“Until a more complete code of laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties, 
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rules of the 
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usage established among civilized 
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience” 
The Clause is also introduced in the Art 1(2) AP I. Certain conduct can still be prohibited 
even if it´s not explicitly prohibited by law. Such a case would be if the conduct were not 
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compatible with the principle of humanity.121 The Marten Clause is basically there to fill in 
the gaps of IHL. It is important especially when means and methods of waging war are 
constantly developing and where new technology and science are being introduced. Some 
have suggested that it is regrettable that it is not invoked as often as it could and should.122 
Nevertheless it continues to be important as affirmed in Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons case.123 
The expansion of Marten Clause to include environmental considerations is not 
impossible, as it has been suggested by the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUNC).124 They further find that the Clause gives IHL a dynamic dimension not limited by 
time and fundamental principles beyond written law. In today’s context of environmental 
concerns and climate change issues, environment has become a part of the “dictates of 
public conscience”.125 This can include some protection to the environment if, by 
environmental destruction, civilians would be submitted to unnecessary suffering. The 
limitations of “unnecessary suffering” can be said to also apply to the environment.126 
Indeed, why should unnecessary suffering only refer to human beings? The entire 
ecosystem can suffer from means and methods of warfare under specific circumstances. 
Giving this much importance to the natural environment in times of armed conflicts could 
perhaps be considered provocative to some scholars and military personnel but one could 
also be provoked by the idea that unnecessary suffering is something imperatively reserved 
for human kind and excludes everything else. 
W.D. Verwey proposes that “the dictates of public conscience” “should be 
interpreted so as to include the requirement of avoiding (at least unnecessary) damage to 
the environment, by reference to today´s widespread awareness and concern through 
society.127 Environmental protection during armed conflicts includes only a few principles 
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and is in process of constant development. The Clause can serve to fill in even those gaps. 
It invites States to apply international minimum standard from principles of international 
law such as the duty to prevent environmental harm and respect the precautionary 
principle. If modern weaponry development and new military strategies pose a new 
emerging threat to the natural environment, the Clause can serve to address this rapid 
evolution of military technology. Indeed, taking precautionary steps would suggest less 
possibility for provoking unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury to humans and 
environment.128 In such way, the Clause invites States to adjust their conduct during 
hostilities to ensure human survival against the environmental consequences of destructive 
human activities.129 However, the Clause as an independent source of law is not considered 
as a proper interpretation and binding by all States. For example, USA considers it to apply 
only to help interpreting existing international law.130 
                                                
128 McDonald, Kleffner and Toebes, supra n. 101, at p. 121. 
129 Shelton, Dina and Kiss, Alexander, ”Martens Clause for Environmental Protection”, Environmental Policy 
and Law, 30/6 (2000), page 286. 
see link here: http://iospress.metapress.com/content/perb914yf1trq4vc/fulltext.pdf . 
130 Wexler, Lesley, Limiting the Precautionary Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific 
Uncertainty, University of California, Davis Law Review, Vol. 39 No. 2, page 480. 
 41 
 
7  “Measuring” Excessiveness – is there a way? 
 
Basically, when the military necessity is established, in a battle ordeal, one could argue that 
there is very little that could not be justified on the basis of military necessity to fulfill the 
mission of the military advantage, if that advantage is of fundamental importance. But, as I 
have concluded earlier, even with military necessity, there can still exist attacks that result 
in damage excessive for the military advantage anticipated. Such a case would be if the 
commander didn´t calculate the risks accordingly. This outcome would constitute an 
unlawful attack in the meaning of IHL provisions. 
How do we measure excessiveness then?  Are the impacts of destruction measured 
for a day or month to come? Or in other words, when is the loss of civilian lives due to the 
destruction of environment disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated? There is 
no obvious answer to this question. Just as there is no quantitative measurement for the 
collateral damage based on objective evaluation in calculation of military advantage.131 
In the Nuclear Weapons case, ICJ explained that it could not conclude whether it would be 
legal or illegal to use nuclear weapons by a State where its survival as a state would be at 
stake.132 This opens up for the possibility that even the usage of nuclear weapons can be 
justified on the basis of military necessity, if for instance, a mere existence of a state is 
threatened.133 With the impacts of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WWII, 
it is not hard to imagine that if any means and methods of waging war could create 
disproportionate damage that would be nuclear weapons. Even in this case the question 
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could be asked whether the complete destruction of the two cities was, in fact, in proportion 
to the military advantage anticipated, the capitulation of Japan. 
Professor Dinstein points out that the view that collateral damage applies “only when 
the disproportion is unbearably large” it to go too far.134  On the other hand, excessive 
collateral damage is not any collateral damage. He gives also example of a situation where 
there would be an obvious breach of the principle of proportionality. He states that the 
destruction of a whole village, with hundreds of civilian casualties, in order to eliminate a 
single enemy sniper would be such an obvious breach.135 The question is if the damage 
caused in Fallujah has been to excessive to the military advantage anticipated? If it is in 
fact a matter of destruction of entire city for capturing one terrorist leader then Professor 
Dinsteins evaluation of the equation one person against 60 000 possible losses of civilian 
lives makes the expected damage excessive. But is the equation 6000 insurgents against 60 
000 possible civilian losses a damage excessive? That might depend on who is evaluating 
the impact. Another aspect to this scenario needs to be point out. We do not know the long-
term damage caused by the deployment of weapons containing WP. Potential long-term 
damage should not necessarily be seen as falling outside of the proportionality assessment 
just because the damage is not immediate. Perhaps, this aspect of scientific uncertainty also 
needs to be addressed when deciding the potential excessiveness of the damage. 
As Professor Hampson points out, the “judgments of a commander balancing military 
necessity is rarely, if ever, subject to legal challenge, let alone criminal sanction”.136 This 
might be the result of the fact that military commanders cannot rely on the lex scripta to tell 
them what exact degree of collateral damage is prohibited. They are at the mercy of their 
own mind to find a balance between goals and values on the battlefield. Even though 
military necessity should not be used to justify excessive collateral damage, the objectivity 
(or perhaps even subjectivity) of a commander is given a high profile.137 This would mean 
that with military necessity established, collateral damage is than assumed to be legal until 
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proven to be excessive. Military actions with no military necessity do not create collateral 
damage. They are simply unlawful under the IHL.  
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8  Indiscriminate attacks 
 
Indiscriminate attacks are stated in Art 51(4) AP I and target attacks that are not directed at 
a specific military objective or employ methods or means of combat that cannot be directed 
at a specific military objective. For example, to fire blindly without a clear idea of the 
nature of the target would constitute an indiscriminate attack.138 They also include those 
means or methods of combat whose effects cannot be limited as required by AP I. These 
attacks are of such nature that they strike military objectives and civilians or civilian 
objects without distinction (my emphasis).139 Such attacks can be conducted during nights, 
in bad weather or extreme heights, where the vision would be too limited to safely target 
military objectives. 
From the point of view of IHL, indiscriminate attacks are no better then those directly 
pointed against civilians and civilian objects (which are absolutely prohibited according to 
Art 51 and 52 AP I) as civilian injuries, in both situations, really are not a matter of concern 
to the attacker.140 One can say that, when executing indiscriminate attacks, the attacker is 
indifferent to the damage the attack is causing to civilians and civilian objects. According 
to ICRC Commentary, an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, are also 
part of the notion of what constitutes an indiscriminate attack.141 An attack that is launched 
indiscriminately and destroys civilian objects, such as the MK 77 bomb, deployed by air, 
would be an attack without military necessity.142 
                                                
138 Dinstein, supra n. 36, at p. 127. 
139 Art 51(4)(c) AP I. 
140 Dinstein, supra n. 36, at p. 127. 
141 ICRC Commentary, supra n. 37, at p. 618, para 1953. 
142 Hayashi, supra n. 46, at p. 115. 
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In the provisions of Art 51(4) AP I there is no reference that the attack must create 
certain results for the attack to be seen as unlawful. The attack is unlawful when it fulfills 
the wording of the article as indiscriminate attack, with or without certain effects. In Kordić 
case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that no particular results were needed for the attack 
to constitute a breach but results of injuries to civilians and civilian objects were necessary 
for the act to constitute a grave breach. ICTY Appeals Chamber explains further: 
 
“Punishment of an unlawful attack on civilians or civilian objects itself, regardless of the 
result, would be based on the concrete endangerment of civilian life and/or property, as the 
perpetrator can no longer control the result of an unlawful attack once launched; thus the 
mere undertaking of such an” in corecto or “in abstracto” extremely dangerous attack 
would be penalized for good reasons”143 
 
One can conclude from this statement that the unlawfulness in the attack lays in the fact 
that the civilian objects were put under the risk of being targeted independently of the 
outcome of that attack. But in order to be prosecuted for the deed on the individual level, 
the risk needs to be turned into a fact. In other words, for the attack to constitute a grave 
breach of AP I, it needs to be committed willfully, but also in the knowledge of that such 
an attack will cause excessive loss of life or damage to civilian objects.144 The prohibition 
against indiscriminate attacks can be said to indirectly provide a protection for the 
environment when the environment makes part of civilian object. In analogy with the 
findings of ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kordić case, it can be said that there is no grave 
breach of this provision unless the attack produces the results of the excessive damage to 
the environment as part of civilian object. 
Art 51(5)(a) AP I is especially interesting for Fallujah case if one is accepting the fact 
that Fallujah might have been considered as a lawful military objective per se because 
lawful military objectives were scattered throughout the city. The article states that an 
                                                
143 Prosecutor v. Kordić et al., ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 2004, para 62. 
Of course, this interpretation is better suited for the underlying purpose of Geneva Convention IV; to ensure 
the protection of civilians whenever possible. 
144 Art 85(3)(b) AP I. 
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indiscriminate attack is also “an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which 
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military 
objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing similar concentration of 
civilians or civilian objects”. Considering the already mentioned possibility that Fallujah 
was treated as a single military objective, the issue arises whether the means and methods 
chosen make such an attack lawful. According to the meaning of this provision, an attack 
on the city by bombardment would constitute an unlawful attack considering the equation 
of civilians against the number of insurgents. 
The decision to employ indiscriminate weapons or attacks is usually a result from 
failure to apply previous provision of AP I such as to take necessary precautions before and 
during the attack by failure to seek precise information on the objects to be attacked. In the 
case of Fallujah, the methods of deployment of munitions containing WP seemed to be 
done indiscriminately breaching one of the cardinal provisions of IHL. Even with the 
purpose to neutralize or disable the enemy, the collateral damage WP produced seems to 
have been in disproportion to the military advantage anticipated when the attack was 
delivered indiscriminately. Such an attack produces excessive damage and it cannot be 
justified on the basis of military necessity. The fact that weapons containing WP were used 
indiscriminately, including the MK 77 bomb delivered by air, the conclusion is that the 
damage inflicted on Fallujah was excessive and militarily unnecessary. Therefore it can be 
said that it was also unlawful. 
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9  Environment and precautions 
 
The environmental effects as well as effects on human health from certain means and 
methods of warfare and the scientific uncertainty that surrounds the subject, make this 
principle highly important from the environmental point of view. In the customary law 
study of ICRC, Rule 44 indicates that means and methods chosen “must be employed with 
due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment”.145 This is a 
reflection of Art 35(3) AP I. It is also an implication that there may exist “an obligation to 
minimize environmental damage while planning or carrying out military operations”.146 
Professor Lesley Wexler suggests that the precautionary principle shifts the burden of 
proof of harm away from those likely to suffer from it and onto those that can cause harm 
with their actions.147 This would mean that those, whose military forces are engaged in a 
battle, would need to disprove the likelihood of environmental harm and health problems 
before launching attacks. Wexler also suggests that the principle adds an extra layer of 
protection by being an alternative to risk assessment and other frameworks with scientific 
uncertainty and hidden scientific presumptions. Being “better off safe then sorry” adds an 
extra margin of safety from potential environmental and health risks from certain 
weapons.148 This is, of course, a certain observation if those in charge respect the fact that 
scientific uncertainty does not absolve them from taking precautionary measures. There is 
also a disagreement between States whether some principles of environmental law in 
peacetime are applicable during armed conflicts when there is no such reference made in 
the treaties.149 In Nuclear Weapon Case, the emphasis has been made that “international 
                                                
145 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 60, at p. 147. 
146 Desgagné, supra n. 44, at p. 117. 
147 Wexler, supra n. 130, at p. 464. 
148 Supra. 
149 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 60, at p. 151. 
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law recognizes the importance of the protection of the environment during armed conflicts, 
and they did not limit themselves to the requirement of treaties specifically applicable to 
armed conflict”.150 There are tendencies also from scholars to suggest that applicable 
treaties in peacetime very much are applicable in wartime as long as they do not represent 
inconsistencies with the laws of armed conflicts.151 The principle of prohibition of 
transboundary harm is one of those important principles. This is related to the notion of a 
“third state”, not involved in the armed conflict. The peacetime concept of sovereignty 
governs the inviolability of a states’ territory. During armed conflicts, the state that is not 
part of the conflict is still protected by the basis of sovereignty and its territory is not to be 
harmed by the effects of armed conflict between other states.152 If precautions are not 
taken, the environmental pollution caused from war destruction can spread into the neutral 
states territory and cause damage. I will not elaborate further on the notion of peacetime 
treaties during time of war, as it is not the main concern of this paper. However, it is 
important to acknowledge the significance of peacetime instruments that may not be 
automatically extinguished just because some countries decide to wage war against one 
another.153 
The starting point for a military commander assessing precautions means that he/she 
chooses from the weapons arsenal at his/hers disposal.  Perhaps, it would not mean that it is 
commanders´ responsibility to decide whether a certain weapon should or should not be 
deployed because its effects are scientifically uncertain. I would suggest that it is a 
responsibility of the State to inform and update its military leadership when such 
precautionary measures need to be taken due to scientific uncertainty. For example, a 
commander can be informed that weapons with WP ammunition need not to be used in 
urban areas if it can be avoided accomplishing same military advantage with another type 
of munitions. In such case, the military commander would know that potential short- as 
well as long-term risk of WP munitions are uncertain and that risk assessment on bases of 
                                                
150 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 60, at p.148. 
151 Supra. 
152 Hulme, supra n. 22, at p. 132. 
153 For further analysis about basis of liability for harm caused to another state I would recommend Corfu 
Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), ICJ, and Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada). 
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protection of environment and human health needs to be included in the assessment of 
military necessity. 
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10  Conclusions 
 
People cannot survive outside of a healthy environment. In spite the fact that one can be of 
a view that environment merits protection per se even in times of war, IHL is only 
concerned with the anthropocentric basis of the environmental protection. Even though the 
environmental protection is somewhat recognized in times of armed conflicts, the 
provisions that directly protect the environment stated in AP I are not applicable in the case 
of Fallujah. The means and methods that were used in Fallujah have not inflicted the level 
of damage that is required for the damage to be unlawful, according to the provisions of Art 
35(3) and Art 55(1) of AP I. Serious damage, however, can still be inflicted without 
reaching the requirement of triple threshold presented in these two provisions. 
With this conclusion, the problem still remains that the environment, both per se and 
as part of civilian objects, together with civilians, is targeted in times of armed conflicts. 
Protection of the environment in times of armed conflicts does not fall outside the scope of 
IHL just because the Art 35 (3) and Art 55(1) are not directly applicable. The damage 
inflicted upon environment must still pass the military criteria for requirements and 
practicalities on the battlefield such as military necessity, military advantage and the 
proportionality test. 
In the case of Fallujah, the environment does not seem to have been directly targeted 
as a military objective. What was targeted are the belligerents located in the city. The 
military advantage anticipated from that attack constitutes the neutralization of the enemy 
under those particular circumstances presented under that specific time in Fallujah. It was a 
military necessity to neutralize the enemy in Fallujah. In order to neutralize the enemy, 
certain military objectives where chosen in the city. Following the attacks in those military 
objectives, the collateral damage created was a near destruction of the city. Even though it 
is hard to establish whether such destruction was excessive to the military advantage 
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anticipated, it might be established that the US forces could in fact envisage that the attack 
launched would, in fact, provoke the near destruction of the city. 
Nevertheless, some parts of this possible destruction did not seem to have been 
included in this assessment, such as the possible long-term damages caused by the toxic 
effects of the means and methods chosen. This seems to be an obvious problem where the 
infliction of environmental damage can be immediate but also may appear for some time 
afterwards. Analyzing the case of Fallujah, even if the immediate damage caused to the 
environment might be said to have been included in the assessment of the collateral 
damage and for that reason militarily necessary, the latter does not. Instead, the long-term 
risk posed to environment seems to have been completely ignored. If the long-term effects 
to the environment were calculated in the assessment of collateral damage, one could have 
come to a conclusion that the attack might perhaps be disproportionate on the basis of the 
conclusion of the long-term damage done to the environment. If the long-term effects to the 
environment do affect the health of the population for the generations to come, it is 
obviously an aspect that needs to be included in the assessment of the collateral damage. In 
Fallujah, this does not seem to have been the case. 
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